At Jutland in 1916, the British Grand Fleet, the most powerfu l in the world, finally engaged and should have crushed its German rival. It failed to do so, and this study aims to reveal that important fa ilures in its handling of the battle o riginated in conflicting styles of command and different understandings of the rules of the game. Andrew Gordon here examines issues of peace and war relevant not only to Jutland but to ali fighting services, and to the present as well as the past. When published in 1997, th is book was praised for providing an engrossing education not only in naval strategy and tactics but in Victorian social attitudes and the influence of character on history. In juxtaposing an operational with a cultural theme, the author comes closer than any historian yet to explaining what was behind the often-described operations of this famous 1916 battle at Jutland. Although the British fleet was victorious over the Germans, the cost in ships and men was high, and debates have raged within British naval circles ever since about why the Royal Navy was unable to take advantage of the situation. The book is the winner of the 1997 Westminster Medal for Military Literature and was the Longman History Today Book of the Year in 1997.